

PKCS #11 v2.20 Amendment 3 - Draft 3

Additional PKCS#11 Mechanisms

RSA Laboratories

November 2006

Editor’s note: This is the third draft of this amendment. Comments and feedback are welcome and should be sent to the Cryptoki mailing list (Cryptoki@rsasecurity.com) or the editor (pkcs-editor@rsasecurity.com)

Table of Contents

1	INTRODUCTION	5
2	DEFINITIONS	5
3	MECHANISMS	5
3.1	ADDITIONAL RSA MECHANISMS	6
3.1.1	Definitions.....	6
3.1.2	PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism parameters.....	6
3.1.3	PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-224.....	6
3.1.4	PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-224.....	7
3.2	ADDITIONAL AES MECHANISMS.....	7
3.2.1	Definitions.....	7
3.2.2	AES mechanism parameters.....	7
	◆ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR.....	7
3.2.3	AES-Counter	8
3.3	SHA-224.....	9
3.3.1	Definitions.....	9
3.3.2	SHA-224 digest.....	9
3.3.3	General-length SHA-224-HMAC.....	9
3.3.4	SHA-224-HMAC.....	10
3.3.5	SHA-224 key derivation.....	10
3.4	CAMELLIA.....	10
3.4.1	Definitions.....	10
3.4.2	Camellia secret key objects	10
3.4.3	Camellia mechanism parameters	11
	◆ CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR.....	11
3.4.4	Camellia key generation.....	12
3.4.5	Camellia-ECB.....	12
3.4.6	Camellia-CBC.....	14

3.4.7	<i>Camellia-CBC with PKCS padding</i>	15
3.4.8	<i>Camellia-Counter</i>	15
3.4.9	<i>General-length Camellia-MAC</i>	16
3.4.10	<i>Camellia-MAC</i>	17
3.5	KEY DERIVATION BY DATA ENCRYPTION - CAMELLIA.....	17
3.5.1	<i>Definitions</i>	17
3.5.2	<i>Mechanism Parameters</i>	18
	◆ <i>CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;</i> <i>CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR</i>	18
3.5.3	<i>Mechanism description</i>	18
3.6	ARIA	19
3.6.1	<i>Definitions</i>	19
3.6.2	<i>ARIA secret key objects</i>	19
3.6.3	<i>ARIA key generation</i>	20
3.6.4	<i>ARIA-ECB</i>	20
3.6.5	<i>ARIA-CBC</i>	21
3.6.6	<i>ARIA-CBC with PKCS padding</i>	22
3.6.7	<i>General-length ARIA-MAC</i>	23
3.6.8	<i>ARIA-MAC</i>	24
3.7	KEY DERIVATION BY DATA ENCRYPTION - ARIA	24
3.7.1	<i>Definitions</i>	24
3.7.2	<i>Mechanism Parameters</i>	24
	◆ <i>CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;</i> <i>CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR</i>	24
3.7.3	<i>Mechanism description</i>	25
A.	MANIFEST CONSTANTS	26
B.	INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONSIDERATIONS	26
C.	REFERENCES	27
D.	ABOUT PKCS	27

List of Tables

TABLE 1, MECHANISMS VS. FUNCTIONS	5
TABLE 2, PKCS #1 MASK GENERATION FUNCTIONS.....	6
TABLE 5: AES-COUNTER: KEY AND DATA LENGTH	8
TABLE 3, SHA-224: DATA LENGTH.....	9
TABLE 4, GENERAL-LENGTH SHA-224-HMAC: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	10
TABLE 6, CAMELLIA SECRET KEY OBJECT ATTRIBUTES	11
TABLE 7, CAMELLIA-ECB: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	13
TABLE 8, CAMELLIA-CBC: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	14
TABLE 9, CAMELLIA-CBC WITH PKCS PADDING: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	15
TABLE 10: CAMELLIA-COUNTER: KEY AND DATA LENGTH	16
TABLE 11, GENERAL-LENGTH CAMELLIA-MAC: KEY AND DATA LENGTH	17
TABLE 12, CAMELLIA-MAC: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	17
TABLE 13, MECHANISM PARAMETERS FOR CAMELLIA-BASED KEY DERIVATION	18
TABLE 14, ARIA SECRET KEY OBJECT ATTRIBUTES	19
TABLE 15, ARIA-ECB: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	21

TABLE 16, ARIA-CBC: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	22
TABLE 17, ARIA-CBC WITH PKCS PADDING: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	23
TABLE 18, GENERAL-LENGTH ARIA-MAC: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	23
TABLE 19, ARIA-MAC: KEY AND DATA LENGTH.....	24
TABLE 20, MECHANISM PARAMETERS FOR ARIA-BASED KEY DERIVATION.....	25

1 Introduction

This document is an amendment to PKCS #11 v2.20 [1] and describes extensions to PKCS #11 to support additional mechanisms.

2 Definitions

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard, as defined in FIPS PUB 197 [7].
ARIA	Korean block-cipher algorithm ARIA.
CAMELLIA	The Camellia encryption algorithm, as defined in RFC 3713 [8].
SHA-224	The Secure Hash Algorithm with a 224-bit message digest, as defined in RFC 3874 [2]. Also defined in FIPS PUB 180-2 with Change Notice 1 [6].

3 Mechanisms

The following table shows, for the mechanisms defined in this document, their support by different cryptographic operations. For any particular token, of course, a particular operation may well support only a subset of the mechanisms listed. There is also no guarantee that a token that supports one mechanism for some operation supports any other mechanism for any other operation (or even supports that same mechanism for any other operation).

Table 1, Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_SHA224				✓			
CKM_SHA224_HMAC		✓					
CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS		✓					
CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS		✓					
CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION							✓
CKM_AES_CTR	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_COUNTER	✓					✓	
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC		✓					
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR ¹	Digest	Gen. Key/Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN					✓		
CKM_ARIA_ECB	✓					✓	
CKM_ARIA_CBC	✓					✓	
CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD	✓					✓	
CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL		✓					
CKM_ARIA_MAC		✓					
CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓
CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA							✓

¹SR = SignRecover, VR = VerifyRecover

The remainder of this section will present in detail the mechanisms and the parameters which are supplied to them.

3.1 Additional RSA mechanisms

For completeness and consistency with all the other SHA variants the following additions have been made to include the SHA-224 variant of these mechanisms.

3.1.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

- CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS
- CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS

3.1.2 PKCS #1 RSA OAEP mechanism parameters

The following table lists the added MGF functions.

Table 2, PKCS #1 Mask Generation Functions

Source Identifier	Value
CKG_MGF1_SHA224	0x00000005

3.1.3 PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-224

The PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA signature with SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS**, performs similarly as the other **CKM_SHAX_RSA_PKCS** mechanisms but uses the SHA-224 hash function.

3.1.4 PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-224

The PKCS #1 RSA PSS signature with SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS**, performs similarly as the other **CKM_SHAX_RSA_PSS** mechanisms but uses the SHA-224 hash function.

3.2 Additional AES Mechanisms

3.2.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_AES_CTR

3.2.2 AES mechanism parameters

◆ **CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR**


CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_AES_CTR** mechanism. It is defined as follows:


```
typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
    CK_BYTE cb[16];
} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

ulCounterBits the number of bits in the counter block (*cb*) that shall be incremented. This number shall be such that $0 < ulCounterBits \leq 128$. For any values outside this range the mechanism shall return **CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID**.

cb specifies the counter block. It's up to the caller to initialize all of the bits in the counter block including the counter bits. The counter bits are the least significant bits of the counter block. They are a big-endian value usually starting with 1. The rest of *cb* is for the nonce, and maybe an optional IV. E.g. as defined in RFC 3686 [4]:





This construction permits each packet to consist of up to $2^{32}-1$ blocks = 4,294,967,295 blocks = 68,719,476,720 octets.

CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS**.

3.2.3 AES-Counter

AES in counter mode, denoted **CKM_AES_COUNTER**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with AES in counter mode.

It has a parameter, a **CK_AES_COUNTER_PARAMS** structure, where the first field indicates the number of bits in the counter block, and the next field is the counter block.

Generic AES counter mode is described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A [3], and in RFC 3686 [4]. These describe encryption using a counter block which may include a nonce to guarantee uniqueness of the counter block. Since the nonce is not incremented, the mechanism parameter must specify the number of counter bits in the counter block.

The block counter is incremented by 1 after each block of plaintext is processed. There is no support for any other increment functions in this mechanism.

If an attempt to encrypt/decrypt is made which will cause an overflow of the counter block's counter bits, then the mechanism shall return **CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE**. Note that the mechanism should allow the final post increment of the counter to overflow (if it implements it this way) but not allow any further processing after this point. E.g. if *ulCounterBits* = 2 and the counter bits start as 1 then only 3 blocks of data can be processed.

Table 3: AES-COUNTER: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_AES	any	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_AES	any	same as input length	no final part

3.3 SHA-224

3.3.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_SHA224
 CKM_SHA224_HMAC
 CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL
 CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION

3.3.2 SHA-224 digest

The SHA-224 mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224**, is a mechanism for message digesting, following the Secure Hash Algorithm with a 224-bit message digest defined in [2].

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on the length of input and output data are summarized in the following table. For single-part digesting, the data and the digest may begin at the same location in memory.

Table 4, SHA-224: Data Length

Function	Input length	Digest length
C_Digest	any	28

3.3.3 General-length SHA-224-HMAC

The general-length SHA-224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL**, is the same as the general-length SHA-1-HMAC mechanism except that it uses the HMAC construction based on the SHA-224 hash function and length of the output should be in the range 0-28. The keys it uses are generic secret keys. FIPS-198 compliant tokens may require the key length to be at least 14 bytes; that is, half the size of the SHA-224 hash output.

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS**, which holds the length in bytes of the desired output. This length should be in the range 0-28 (the output size of SHA-224 is 28 bytes). FIPS-198 compliant tokens may constrain the output length to be at least 4 or 14 (half the maximum length). Signatures (MACs) produced by this mechanism will be taken from the start of the full 28-byte HMAC output.

Table 5, General-length SHA-224-HMAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	generic secret	Any	0-28, depending on parameters
C_Verify	generic secret	Any	0-28, depending on parameters

3.3.4 SHA-224-HMAC

The SHA-224-HMAC mechanism, denoted **CKM_SHA224_HMAC**, is a special case of the general-length SHA-224-HMAC mechanism.

It has no parameter, and always produces an output of length 28.

3.3.5 SHA-224 key derivation

SHA-224 key derivation, denoted **CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION**, is the same as the SHA-1 key derivation mechanism in Section 12.21.5 of [1], except that it uses the SHA-224 hash function and the relevant length is 28 bytes.

3.4 CAMELLIA

Camellia is a block cipher with 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, similar to AES. Camellia is described e.g. in IETF RFC 3713 ([8]).

3.4.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “**CKK_CAMELLIA**” for type **CK_KEY_TYPE** as used in the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

```

CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC
CKM_CAMELLIA_COUNTER
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC
CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD

```

3.4.2 Camellia secret key objects

Camellia secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_CAMELLIA**) hold Camellia keys. The following table defines the Camellia secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 6, Camellia Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

⁷ Refer to table 15 of [1] for footnotes.

The following is a sample template for creating a Camellia secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_CAMELLIA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "A Camellia secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}
};

```

3.4.3 Camellia mechanism parameters

◆ CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR

CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```


typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
    CK_BYTE cb[16];
} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

- ulCounterBits* specifies the number of bits in the counter block (*cb*) that shall be incremented. This number shall be such that $0 < ulCounterBits \leq 128$. For any values outside this range the mechanism shall return **CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID**.
- cb* specifies the counter block. It's up to the caller to initialize all of the bits in the counter block including

the counter bits. The counter bits are the least significant bits of the counter block. They are a big-endian value usually starting with 1. The rest of *cb* is for the nonce, and maybe an optional IV. E.g. as defined in RFC 3686 [4]:



This construction permits each packet to consist of up to $2^{32}-1$ blocks = 4,294,967,295 blocks = 68,719,476,720 octets.

CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS**.

3.4.4 Camellia key generation

The Camellia key generation mechanism, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN**, is a key generation mechanism for Camellia.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates Camellia keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the **CKA_CLASS**, **CKA_KEY_TYPE**, and **CKA_VALUE** attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the Camellia key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

3.4.5 Camellia-ECB

Camellia-ECB, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 7, Camellia-ECB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

3.4.6 Camellia-CBC

Camellia-CBC, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 8, Camellia-CBC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

3.4.7 Camellia-CBC with PKCS padding

Camellia-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Camellia; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism can wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, EC (also related to ECDSA) and DSA private keys (see Section TBA for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 9, Camellia-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block length bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

3.4.8 Camellia-Counter

Camellia in counter mode, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_COUNTER**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption with CAMELLIA in counter mode.

It has a parameter, a **CK_CAMELLIA_COUNTER_PARAMS** structure, where the first field indicates the number of bits in the counter block, and the next field is the counter block.

Generic counter mode is described in NIST Special Publication 800-38A [3], and Camellia counter mode is described in [9]. These describe encryption using a counter block which may include a nonce to guarantee uniqueness of the counter block. Since the nonce is not incremented, the mechanism parameter must specify the number of counter bits in the counter block.

The block counter is incremented by 1 after each block of plaintext is processed. There is no support for any other increment functions in this mechanism.

If an attempt to encrypt/decrypt is made which will cause an overflow of the counter block's counter bits to be used then the mechanism shall return **CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE**.

Note that the mechanism should allow the final post increment of the counter to overflow (if it implements it this way) but not allow any further processing after this point. E.g. if *ulCounterBits* = 2 and the counter bits start as 1 then only 3 blocks of data can be processed.

Table 10: Camellia-COUNTER: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of 16	same as input length
C_Decrypt	CKK_CAMELLIA	multiple of 16	same as input length

3.4.9 General-length Camellia-MAC

General-length Camellia -MAC, denoted **CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on Camellia [8] and data authentication as defined in [5].

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final Camellia cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 11, General-length Camellia-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

3.4.10 Camellia-MAC

Camellia-MAC, denoted by **CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length Camellia-MAC mechanism. Camellia-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 12, Camellia-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_CAMELLIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Camellia key sizes, in bytes.

3.5 Key derivation by data encryption - Camellia

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

3.5.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

- CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
- CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

3.5.2 Mechanism Parameters

◆ **CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR**

CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA** mechanism. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
    CK_ULONG     length;
} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

- iv* 16-octet initialization vector
- pData* pointer to data to encrypt
- length* length of data to to encrypt

CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR is a pointer to a **CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS**.

3.5.3 Mechanism description

See 12.14.3 of [1] for a general description of how these mechanisms work.

These mechanisms uses **CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS**, and **CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA** as defined in section 12.34.2 of [1].

Table 13, Mechanism Parameters for Camellia-based key derivation

Mechanism	Mechanism parameter
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.
CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS structure. Parameter is a 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

3.6 ARIA

ARIA is a block cipher with 128-bit block size and 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, similar to AES. ARIA is described in NSRI “Specification of ARIA”([8]).

3.6.1 Definitions

This section defines the key type “CKK_ARIA” for type CK_KEY_TYPE as used in the CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute of key objects.

Mechanisms:

```

CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN
CKM_ARIA_ECB
CKM_ARIA_CBC
CKM_ARIA_MAC
CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL
CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD
    
```

3.6.2 ARIA secret key objects

ARIA secret key objects (object class **CKO_SECRET_KEY**, key type **CKK_ARIA**) hold ARIA keys. The following table defines the ARIA secret key object attributes, in addition to the common attributes defined for this object class:

Table 14, ARIA Secret Key Object Attributes

Attribute	Data type	Meaning
CKA_VALUE ^{1,4,6,7}	Byte array	Key value (16, 24, or 32 bytes)
CKA_VALUE_LEN ^{2,3,6}	CK_ULONG	Length in bytes of key value

¹ Refer to table 15 of [1] for footnotes.

The following is a sample template for creating a ARIA secret key object:

```

CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_ARIA;
CK_UTF8CHAR label[] = "An ARIA secret key object";
CK_BYTE value[] = {...};
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_TOKEN, &>true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_LABEL, label, sizeof(label)-1},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
}
    
```

```
    {CKA_VALUE, value, sizeof(value)}  
};
```

3.6.3 ARIA key generation

The ARIA key generation mechanism, denoted `CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN`, is a key generation mechanism for Aria.

It does not have a parameter.

The mechanism generates ARIA keys with a particular length in bytes, as specified in the `CKA_VALUE_LEN` attribute of the template for the key.

The mechanism contributes the `CKA_CLASS`, `CKA_KEY_TYPE`, and `CKA_VALUE` attributes to the new key. Other attributes supported by the ARIA key type (specifically, the flags indicating which functions the key supports) may be specified in the template for the key, or else are assigned default initial values.

For this mechanism, the `ulMinKeySize` and `ulMaxKeySize` fields of the `CK_MECHANISM_INFO` structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

3.6.4 ARIA-ECB

ARIA-ECB, denoted `CKM_ARIA_ECB`, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on Aria and electronic codebook mode.

It does not have a parameter.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the `CKA_VALUE` attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the `CKA_KEY_TYPE` attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the `CKA_VALUE_LEN` attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the `CKA_VALUE` attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 15, ARIA-ECB: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

3.6.5 ARIA-CBC

ARIA-CBC, denoted **CKM_ARIA_CBC**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on ARIA and cipher-block chaining mode.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

This mechanism can wrap and unwrap any secret key. Of course, a particular token may not be able to wrap/unwrap every secret key that it supports. For wrapping, the mechanism encrypts the value of the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the key that is wrapped, padded on the trailing end with up to block size minus one null bytes so that the resulting length is a multiple of the block size. The output data is the same length as the padded input data. It does not wrap the key type, key length, or any other information about the key; the application must convey these separately.

For unwrapping, the mechanism decrypts the wrapped key, and truncates the result according to the **CKA_KEY_TYPE** attribute of the template and, if it has one, and the key type supports it, the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute of the template. The mechanism contributes the result as the **CKA_VALUE** attribute of the new key; other attributes required by the key type must be specified in the template.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 16, ARIA-CBC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length	Comments
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	same as input length	no final part
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size	
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	determined by type of key being unwrapped or CKA_VALUE_LEN	

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of Aria key sizes, in bytes.

3.6.6 ARIA-CBC with PKCS padding

ARIA-CBC with PKCS padding, denoted **CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part encryption and decryption; key wrapping; and key unwrapping, based on ARIA; cipher-block chaining mode; and the block cipher padding method detailed in PKCS #7.

It has a parameter, a 16-byte initialization vector.

The PKCS padding in this mechanism allows the length of the plaintext value to be recovered from the ciphertext value. Therefore, when unwrapping keys with this mechanism, no value should be specified for the **CKA_VALUE_LEN** attribute.

In addition to being able to wrap and unwrap secret keys, this mechanism can wrap and unwrap RSA, Diffie-Hellman, X9.42 Diffie-Hellman, EC (also related to ECDSA) and DSA private keys (see Section TBA for details). The entries in the table below for data length constraints when wrapping and unwrapping keys do not apply to wrapping and unwrapping private keys.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 17, ARIA-CBC with PKCS Padding: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Input length	Output length
C_Encrypt	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_Decrypt	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block size bytes shorter than input length
C_WrapKey	CKK_ARIA	any	input length rounded up to multiple of the block size
C_UnwrapKey	CKK_ARIA	multiple of block size	between 1 and block length bytes shorter than input length

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

3.6.7 General-length ARIA-MAC

General-length ARIA -MAC, denoted **CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL**, is a mechanism for single- and multiple-part signatures and verification, based on ARIA and data authentication as defined in [8].

It has a parameter, a **CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS** structure, which specifies the output length desired from the mechanism.

The output bytes from this mechanism are taken from the start of the final ARIA cipher block produced in the MACing process.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 18, General-length ARIA-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_ARIA	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters
C_Verify	CKK_ARIA	any	0-block size, as specified in parameters

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

3.6.8 ARIA-MAC

ARIA-MAC, denoted by **CKM_ARIA_MAC**, is a special case of the general-length ARIA-MAC mechanism. ARIA-MAC always produces and verifies MACs that are half the block size in length.

It does not have a parameter.

Constraints on key types and the length of data are summarized in the following table:

Table 19, ARIA-MAC: Key And Data Length

Function	Key type	Data length	Signature length
C_Sign	CKK_ARIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)
C_Verify	CKK_ARIA	any	½ block size (8 bytes)

For this mechanism, the *ulMinKeySize* and *ulMaxKeySize* fields of the **CK_MECHANISM_INFO** structure specify the supported range of ARIA key sizes, in bytes.

3.7 Key derivation by data encryption - ARIA

These mechanisms allow derivation of keys using the result of an encryption operation as the key value. They are for use with the C_DeriveKey function.

3.7.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA
 CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA

3.7.2 Mechanism Parameters

- ◆ **CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;**
CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR

CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA** mechanism. It is defined as follows:


```
typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
    CK_ULONG     length;
} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR
CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

- iv* 16-octet initialization vector
- pData* data to encrypt
- length* length of data to encrypt

CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR isa pointer to a **CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS**.

3.7.3 Mechanism description

See 12.14.3 of [1] for a general description of how these mechanisms work.

These mechanisms uses CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS, and CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA as defined in section 12.34.2 of [1].

Table 20, Mechanism Parameters for Aria-based key derivation

Mechanism parameter	Dependency
CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA structure. Parameter is the data to be encrypted and must be a multiple of 16 long.
CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA	Uses CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS. Parameter is an 16 byte IV value followed by the data. The data value part must be a multiple of 16 bytes long.

A. Manifest constants

The following definitions can be found in the appropriate header file.

```
#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255
#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256
#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257
#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046
#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047
#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396
#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005

#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086

#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557
#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558

#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026
#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560
#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561
#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562
#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563
#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564
#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565
#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566
#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567
```

B. Intellectual property considerations

RSA Security Inc. makes no patent claims on the general constructions described in this document, although specific underlying techniques may be covered.

Copyright © 2006 RSA Security Inc. All rights reserved. License to copy this document and furnish the copies to others is granted provided that the above copyright notice is included on all such copies. This document should be identified as “RSA: PKCS #11 V2.20 Amendment 3” in all material mentioning or referencing this document.

RSA is a registered trademark of RSA Security Inc. in the United States and/or other countries. The names of other products or services mentioned may be the trademarks of their respective owners.

This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and RSA SECURITY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED

WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. RSA Security Inc. makes no representations regarding intellectual property claims by other parties. Such determination is the responsibility of the user.

C. References

- [1] RSA Laboratories. *PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token Interface Standard*. Version 2.20, June 2004. URL: <ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-11/v2-20/pkcs-11v2-20.pdf>.
- [2] Smit et al, "A 224-bit One-way Hash Function: SHA-224," IETF RFC 3874, June 2004. URL: <http://ietf.org/rfc/rfc3874.txt>.
- [3] National Institute for Standards and Technology, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation," NIST SP 800-38A. URL: <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf>.
- [4] Housley, "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)," IETF RFC 3686, January 2004. URL: <http://ietf.org/rfc/rfc3686.txt>.
- [5] FIPS Publication 113, "Computer Data Authentication," U.S. DoC/NIST, May 1985. URL: <http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip113.htm>.
- [6] FIPS Publication 180-2, "Specifications for the Secure Hash Standard," U.S. DoC/NIST, February 2004. URL: <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf>.
- [7] FIPS Publication 197, "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard," U.S. DoC/NIST, November 2001. URL: <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.
- [8] Matsui, et al, "A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm," IETF RFC 3717, April 2004. URL: <http://ietf.org/rfc/rfc3713.txt>.
- [9] Kato, et al, "The Additional Modes of Operation for Camellia and Its Use With IPsec," IETF work in progress, November 2006. Current URL: <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-modes-01.txt>. URL: <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-modes-01.txt>
- [10] National Security Research Institute, Korea, "Block Cipher Algorithm ARIA", URL: <http://www.nsri.re.kr/ARIA/doc/ARIA-specification-e.pdf>.

D. About PKCS

The *Public Key Cryptography Standards* are documents produced by RSA, The Security Division of EMC, in cooperation with secure systems developers for the purpose of simplifying integration and management of accelerating the deployment of public-key cryptography and strong authentication technology into secure applications, and to enhance the user experience of these technologies.

RSA plans further development of the PKCS series through mailing list discussions and occasional workshops, and suggestions for improvement are welcome. Results may also be submitted to standards forums. For more information, contact:

PKCS Editor
RSA, The Security Division of EMC
174 Middlesex Turnpike
Bedford, MA 01730 USA
pkcs-editor@rsasecurity.com
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/>